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Abstract 
 
Using Statistics Canada’s Longitudinal Worker File, we document short-term and long-term 
earnings losses for a large (10%) sample of Canadian workers who lost their job through firm 
closures  or mass layoffs during the late 1980s and the 1990s. Our use of a nationally 
representative sample allows us to examine how earnings losses vary across age groups, gender, 
industries and firms of different sizes. Furthermore, we conduct separate analyses for workers 
displaced only through firm closures and for a broader sample displaced either through firm 
closures or mass layoffs. Our main finding is that while the long-term earnings losses 
experienced on average by workers who are displaced through firm closures or mass layoffs are 
important, those experienced by displaced workers with considerable seniority appear to be even 
more substantial. Consistent with findings from the United States by Jacobson, Lalonde and 
Sullivan (1993), high-seniority displaced men experience long-term earnings losses that represent 
between 18% and 35% of their pre-displacement earnings. For their female counterparts, the 
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Executive summary 
 
What is the magnitude of earnings losses that Canadian workers suffer several years after being 
displaced? The answer to this question is currently unknown.  Several of the previous studies are 
based on U.S. data and have shown that, even five years after displacement, displaced workers 
still suffer substantial earnings losses. However, most of the evidence offered is based either on a 
sub-sample of high-tenure workers in a specific region or on relatively small samples drawn from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Furthermore, the evidence presented is not recent since it 
covers either the early to mid-1980s or the early 1990s. Canadian studies of worker displacement 
have compared pre-displacement wages to wages observed shortly after displacement but have 
been unable to quantify the magnitude of the earnings losses suffered several years after 
displacement. 
 
The goal of this paper is to fill this gap and to quantify the earnings losses experienced up to five 
years after displacement by Canadian workers who lost their job during the late 1980s and the 
1990s as a result of firm closures or mass layoffs. To do so, we take advantage of Statistics 
Canada’s Longitudinal Worker File, a unique administrative data set that tracks a large (10%) 
sample of Canadian workers throughout the 1983 to 2002 period. 
 
Quantifying the earnings losses that Canadian workers experience several years after 
displacement is important for several reasons.  First, Canada’s Employment Insurance program 
covers unemployed workers up to one year but the earnings losses suffered by many Canadian 
displaced workers might well extend beyond that one-year period. Since: a) displaced workers 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs of resource reallocation that the Canadian economy 
experiences due to technological changes, growth in international trade and changes in 
consumers’ preferences; and b) such resource reallocation is generally thought to be productivity-
enhancing, assessing the magnitude of the earnings losses experienced after the first post-
displacement year is a prerequisite for the design of policies, if any, aimed at compensating these 
workers.  
 
Second, earnings losses that extend over a one-year period likely affect the well-being of 
Canadian displaced workers in numerous ways. They may signal the loss of: a) rents due to union 
coverage or employment in large firms, b) important firm-specific skills or industry-specific 
skills or c) good job matches. All of these factors likely imply a permanent drop in workers’ 
earnings. Since they are not fully compensated by increases in wives’ labour supply, longer-term 
earnings losses of displaced workers may affect the stability of family earnings, thereby 
potentially influencing the consumption patterns of families affected by displacement.  
 
Our main finding is that while the long-term earnings losses (i.e., those suffered five years after 
displacement) experienced, on average, by workers who are displaced through firm closures or 
mass layoffs are important, those experienced by displaced workers with considerable seniority 
appear to be even more substantial. Consistent with findings from the United States by Jacobson, 
Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), high-seniority displaced men experience long-term earnings losses 
that represent between 18% and 35% of their pre-displacement earnings. For their female 
counterparts, the corresponding estimates vary between 24% and 35%. 
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I.   Introduction 
 
What is the magnitude of the long-term earnings losses that Canadian workers suffer as a result 
of displacement? Since most of the evidence offered to date on this issue is based on U.S. data, 
the answer to this important question is currently unknown. Previous U.S. studies have shown 
that displaced workers suffer substantial and persistent earnings losses. However, most of the 
evidence offered is based either on a specific region (e.g., Pennsylvania in Jacobson, Lalonde and 
Sullivan, 1993) or on relatively small samples drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(Ruhm, 1991; Stevens, 1997). Furthermore, the evidence presented is not recent since it covers 
either the early to mid-1980s or the early 1990s.  
 
In this paper, we fill this gap and document the short-term and long-term earnings losses 
experienced by Canadian workers who lost their job as a result of displacement that occurred 
during the late 1980s and the 1990s. To do so, we take advantage of Statistics Canada’s 
Longitudinal Worker File, a unique data set that tracks a large (10%) sample of Canadian 
workers throughout the 1983 to 2002 period. 
 
Quantifying the earnings losses of Canadian displaced workers is important for several reasons.  
High earnings losses may signal the loss of important firm-specific skills or industry-specific 
skills and/or good job matches (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993), which in turn may imply 
a permanent drop in workers’ earnings. Since they are not fully compensated by increases in 
wives’ labour supply (Stephens, 2002), they imply high instability of family earnings, thereby 
potentially influencing the consumption patterns of families affected by displacement (Gruber, 
1997; Browning and Crossley, 2001). They may create stress and anxiety for displaced workers, 
reduce their sense of control over their lives and potentially increase their vulnerability to mental 
health problems in the longer run (Hamilton et al., 1997). They may increase chances of family 
dissolution (Charles and Stephens, 2004), thereby affecting family members’ well-being in an 
important way. Finally, they may substantially affect the retirement income of workers laid-off 
from companies offering defined-benefit registered pension plans whose benefits cannot be 
transferred to other plans elsewhere in the economy.  
 
Arguably, policy makers might also be interested in understanding how job loss affects workers’ 
employment income in the longer run. Since: a) Canada’s Employment Insurance program covers 
unemployed workers up to one year, b) displaced workers bear a disproportionate share of the 
costs of resource reallocation that the Canadian economy experiences due to technological 
changes, growth in international trade and changes in consumers’ preferences,  and  c) such 
resource reallocation is generally thought to be productivity-enhancing, assessing the magnitude 
of the earnings losses experienced after the first post-displacement year is a prerequisite for the 
design of policies, if any, aimed at compensating these workers.  
 
While our main contribution is to provide Canadian evidence on the long-term costs of worker 
displacement, we refine previous work on worker displacement in several ways. First, previous 
U.S. studies of worker displacement have been unable to exclude from their samples individuals 
who voluntarily quit their job (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993) and/or those who have 
been fired due to bad performance (Ruhm, 1991; Stevens, 1997). To overcome this limitation, 
some have relied on a sample of workers who separated from their employer as a result of mass 
layoffs (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993). In contrast, the data set we use in this study  
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allows us not only to separate quits, layoffs and other types of separations, but also to identify 
permanent layoffs that occur in the year during which a firm ceases operating or experiences 
mass layoffs. This in turn allows us to define worker displacement rigorously. We define 
displaced workers in two ways. Our first definition identifies displaced workers as those who are 
permanently laid-off in year t from firms that close during that year. Since this definition 
identifies displacement through companies’ deaths, it does not capture mass layoffs (e.g., those 
due to plant closures) that occur in multi-establishment companies that do not cease operating. 
To overcome this limitation, we also use an alternative definition that is broader and includes not 
only workers who are displaced through firm closures, but also those who lose their job through 
mass layoffs.  
 
Second, while previous U.S. studies have relied on data sets that are based either on a specific 
region (e.g.,  Pennsylvania in Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993) or on relatively small 
samples drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Ruhm, 1991; Stevens, 1997), we rely 
on a large (10%) data set that is based on a nationally representative sample of Canadian 
workers. Third, while the aforementioned studies provide evidence that does not go beyond the 
early 1990s, we provide more recent evidence on the long-term costs of worker displacement 
since we use data that document post-displacement effects up to 2002.  
 
Fourth, while a recent study (Hijzen, Upward and Wright, 2005) using data from the United 
Kingdom examines the long-term earnings losses experienced on average by workers displaced 
through firm closures, we extend the analysis of the long-term consequences of displacement due 
to firm closures by analyzing both the long-term earnings losses experienced on average by 
workers displaced through firm closures and the long-term earnings losses experienced by high-
seniority  workers displaced through firm closures. As  our results clearly show, conclusions 
regarding the average long-term earnings losses resulting from firm closures do not generalize to 
the sub-sample of high-seniority workers displaced through firm closures.  
 
When we pool together workers displaced through firm closures and those displaced through 
mass layoffs, we find that the long-term earnings losses experienced on average by displaced 
workers  are important. However, those experienced by displaced workers with considerable 
seniority appear to be even more substantial. Consistent with findings from the United States by 
Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), high-seniority displaced men experience long-term 
earnings losses that represent between 18% and 35% of their pre-displacement earnings. For their 
female counterparts, the corresponding estimates vary between 24% and 35%. 
 
II.  Prior research  
 
So far, Canadian research on displacement has focused mainly on the risk of job loss. Picot and 
Lin (1997) examine the evolution of permanent layoff rates over the 1978 to 1994 period. 
Looking at years which are comparable in the business cycle, they find no upward trend in 
permanent layoff rates in the aggregate. However, they observe an increase in the probability of 
permanent layoffs among older and high-paid workers. Morissette (2004) updates the work of 
Picot and Lin (1997) and finds little evidence that Canadian workers’ chances of being 
permanently laid-off rose substantially between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. He shows that 
while the risk of job loss has increased in a non-negligible way in some industries and in large 
firms of the private sector, men and women of different age groups have generally not  
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experienced drastic increases in their likelihood of being permanently laid-off.  Both studies 
implicitly include in their measure of job loss: a) layoffs resulting from firm closures, b) mass 
layoffs not resulting from firm closures (e.g., mass layoff due to downsizing) and, c) layoffs that 
occur on an individual basis. 
 
To our knowledge, Picot and Wannell (1987) and Crossley et al. (1994) are the only Canadian 
studies that analyze workers’ earnings losses following displacement. Picot and Wannell (1987) 
use the 1986 Survey of Displaced Workers and compare weekly earnings in the new job obtained 
after displacement to weekly earnings in the job held prior to displacement. Crossley et al. (1994) 
perform a similar exercise using hourly wage data from a survey of 1,736 workers involved in 
mass layoffs in the early 1980s in 21 establishments in Ontario. Because they simply compute the 
earnings changes observed between the two types of jobs, neither of these two studies account for 
the potential earnings growth displaced workers might have enjoyed in the absence of 
displacement. Furthermore, the numbers presented are short-run estimates and thus, cannot be 
used to assess the magnitude of the long-term earnings losses experienced by Canadian workers 
as a result of displacement. 
 
In contrast, numerous U.S. studies have documented the magnitude of the long-term earnings 
losses  due to displacement (see the reviews by Fallick, 1996  and Kletzer, 1998).  Using 
Pennsylvania administrative data, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) show that the earnings 
losses of high-tenure prime-age workers persist well beyond a period of unemployment due to 
mass layoffs. Earnings fall even before the displacement takes place and drop sharply at the time 
of the displacement. Even five years after the displacement took place, high-seniority displaced 
workers report quarterly earnings that are about 25% lower than their pre-displacement earnings. 
Worse still, it seems very likely that the earnings of displaced workers do not return to their 
expected levels at any time. Ruhm (1991) and Stevens (1997) also analyze the earnings losses of 
displaced workers, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. While Ruhm (1991) 
finds that, four years after displacement, weekly earnings of displaced workers are 10 to 13% 
lower than those of their non-displaced counterparts, Stevens (1997) shows  that the annual 





Recently, Hijzen, Upward and Wright (2005) use a 1% sample of employees in the United 
Kingdom and examine earnings losses resulting from business closures. Contrary to findings 
from U.S. studies, they find that earnings losses, while initially large, last less than four or five 
years.  
 
While the aforementioned studies have substantially improved our understanding of the long-
term consequences of worker displacement, they are subject to a certain number of limitations.  
 
First,  U.S. studies  have been unable to exclude from their sample (of displaced workers) 
individuals who voluntarily quit their job (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993) and/or those 
who have been fired due to bad performance (Ruhm, 1991; Stevens, 1997). To overcome this 
limitation, some have relied on a sample of workers who separated from their employer as a 
                                                            
1.  While Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) require displaced workers to have at least six years of tenure with 
their employer, Ruhm (1991) and Stevens (1997) do not impose this restriction. 
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result of mass layoffs (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993). In contrast, the data set we use in 
this study allows us to separate quits, layoffs and other types of separations and to identify layoffs 
that occur in the year during which a firm ceases operating or experiences mass layoffs. This in 
turn allows us to define worker displacement rigorously.  
 
We define displaced workers in two ways. Our first definition identifies displaced workers as 
those who are permanently laid-off in year t from firms that close during that year. Since this 
definition identifies displacement through companies’ deaths, it does not capture mass layoffs 
(e.g., those due to plant closures) that occur in multi-establishment companies that do not cease 
operating. To overcome this limitation, we also use an alternative definition that is broader and 
includes not only workers who are displaced through firm closures, but also those who lose their 
job through mass layoffs. Since firm closures and mass layoffs affect most/all workers in a given 
firm, irrespective of their abilities and/or recent performance on the job, focusing on 
displacements that occur as a result of firm closures and/or mass layoffs mitigates the sample 
selection problem associated with the event of job loss. As Gibbons and Katz (1991) have 





A second limitation of previous U.S. studies is that they have relied on data sets that are based 
either on a specific region (e.g., Pennsylvania in Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993) or on 
relatively small samples drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Ruhm, 1991; 
Stevens, 1997), In contrast, we rely on a large (10%) data set that is based on a nationally 
representative sample of Canadian workers.  
 
Third, while the aforementioned U.S. studies provide evidence that does not go beyond the early 
1990s, we can provide more recent evidence on the long-term costs of worker displacement since 
we use data on post-displacement effects that go as far as 2002.  
 
Fourth, while Hijzen, Upward and Wright (2005) use a 1% random sample of workers displaced 
through firm closures, we use a 10% sample of workers displaced through firm closures. This 
allows us to assess not only the average earnings losses experienced by these displaced workers, 
but also those experienced by the subset of displaced workers who have substantial seniority with 
the firm. Like Hijzen, Upward and Wright (2005), we find some evidence that average earnings 
losses experienced by workers displaced through firm closures  disappear fiver years after 
displacement. However, when we focus our attention on the sub-sample of high-seniority 
workers displaced though firm closures—an exercise that Hijzen, Upward and Wright (2005) do 
not perform—we find that these workers experience long-term (i.e., five-year after displacement) 
earnings losses that represent between 19% and 35% of their pre-displacement earnings. This 
strongly suggests that Hijzen, Upward and Wright’s finding does not generalize to all workers 
displaced through firm closures. 
 
Finally, since the studies above rely on data from the Unites States or the United Kingdom, the 
degree to which their results apply to the Canadian economy remains unclear.  
 
                                                            
2.  See also Doiron (1995) for a Canadian test of this hypothesis. 
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III.  Data  
 




 The LWF is created by the Business and Labour Market Analysis (BLMA) 
Division of Statistics Canada. It is a 10 % random sample of all Canadian workers, constructed 
by integrating data from four sources: the Record of Employment (ROE) files of Human 
Resources and Social Development Canada (on worker separations), the T1 and T4 files of 
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, and the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program 
(LEAP) of BLMA, Statistics Canada. In its current version, the LWF has a 20-year longitudinal 
window since it follows individuals over the 1983 to 2002 period. 
The Employment Insurance Act and its Regulations require every employer to issue a ROE when 
an employee working in insurable employment has an interruption in earnings. The information 
contained on the ROE is used to determine if a person qualifies for Employment Insurance (EI) 
benefits, the benefit rate and the duration of his/her claim. The ROE must be issued even if the 
employee does not intend to file a claim for EI benefits.  More importantly, the ROE indicates 
the reason for the work interruption or separation.
4
 
 The ROE can thus be used to identify workers 
who are laid-off, who quit or who separate from their employer for other reasons.  
One key feature of the LWF is the fact that it is linked to LEAP, a longitudinal file that tracks all 
Canadian companies. Since LEAP identifies firms’ births and deaths, the linkage between LEAP 
and LWF allows us to identify layoffs that occur as a result of firm closures.
5  This in turn allows 
us to construct a rigorous indicator of worker displacement: a displacement is defined as taking 
place when a worker is permanently laid-off in year t from a firm that ceased operating during 
that year.
6
                                                            
3.   In principle, the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics could be used to examine the earnings trajectories of 
displaced workers. However, this survey follows individuals only over six years, thereby preventing a thorough 
analysis of workers’ earnings several years prior to and after displacement. 
 Since firm closures affect all workers in a given firm, irrespective of their abilities 
and/or recent performance on the job, focusing on displacements that occur as a result of firm 
closures mitigates the sample selection problem associated with the event  of job loss. As 
Gibbons and Katz (1991) have argued, this sample selection problem can be important for 
workers laid-off on an individual basis. 
 
4.   A penalty under the Employment Insurance Act for non-compliance may apply to employers who fail to issue a 
ROE. Moreover, employers who enter a false or misleading reason for a separation may be subject to penalty or 
prosecution. 
 
5.   The universe of LEAP includes businesses, incorporated or not, that issue a record of employment earnings to 
each of its employees for tax purposes (a T4 remittance slip). Businesses comprised solely of individuals or 
partnerships that do not draw a salary are excluded from LEAP. Considerable methodological verification takes 
place to ensure that the longitudinal linkage of companies is reliable. In particular, “false” deaths are identified 
by using a “labour tracking” methodology aimed at distinguishing merger/acquisitions from real firm closures.  
See Baldwin, Dupuy and Penner (1993) for more details. 
 
6.   In contrast, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) cannot precisely identify the type of separation (e.g., quits, 
layoffs) experienced by their sample of workers. For that reason, they focus their analysis on workers who 
separate from firms experiencing severe employment reductions.  Likewise, Stevens (1997) defines 
displacement as leaving due to a plant or business closing or due to being laid-off or fired. Thus, she cannot 
eliminate from her sample of displaced workers individuals who were fired for cause.  Because we can identify 
precisely the type of separation and focus on layoffs due to firm closures, we can avoid both of these problems.  
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In addition, all employers must register with Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency and issue 
to each employee a T4 slip that summarizes earnings received in the year. The T4 files provide 
information on virtually all Canadian workers. Thus, the number of workers who are at risk of 
being displaced are known from the T4 files while the number of workers who are actually 
displaced are known by combining the ROE files and LEAP. Furthermore, combining the T4 
files, the ROE files and LEAP allows us to construct a comparison group of workers who never 
experienced displacement during the observation period. 
 
Another advantage of the LWF is its very large sample size, which allows detailed analyses of 
the earnings losses of various groups of displaced workers. Below, we take advantage of this 
large sample size by conducting separate analyses for various age-gender groups, industries and 
firm size classes. 
 
While the LWF allows us to identify firm closures, it contains no information on establishment 
closures. Because many large firms consist of multiple establishments, plant closures may occur 
and cause mass layoffs without inducing firm closures. Since our first definition of displacement 
is based on firm closures, it will not capture these job losses. To take these into account, we use a 
broader definition of displacement that includes not only workers who lose their job through firm 
closures, but also those who lose their job through mass layoffs.  
 
We define mass layoffs as permanent layoffs that occur in year t in firms that had at least 50 
employees in year t-4 and experienced a drop in employment of 30% or more between year t-4 
and year t+1, the year following layoffs. 
 
Like most administrative data sets, the LWF contains no information on workers’ labour force 
status, education, occupation, visible minority status and immigration status. Hence, it does not 
allow separate analyses for, say, workers with different education levels. While these limitations 
should be kept in mind, the fact that the LWF follows a large and nationally representative 
sample of workers over a substantial period makes it a unique data set to assess the magnitude of 
the earnings losses experienced by displaced workers both in the short run and the long run. 
Furthermore, the econometric models we use allow considerable flexibility in specifying 
workers’ age-earnings profiles. As will be shown below, workers’ age-earnings profiles will be 
allowed to differ both in terms of their intercepts and their slope, thereby accounting for the 
possibility that some workers (e.g.,  university graduates) may start their career with lower 
earnings (i.e.,  a small intercept) than other workers (e.g.,  high school graduates) but may 
experience relatively faster earnings growth (i.e., have a steeper slope) subsequently.  
 
IV.  Methodology and sample selection  
 
To measure the long-term costs of worker displacement, we proceed in two steps. We start by 
regressing workers’ annual earnings on a full set of province by year dummy variables. The 
residuals yit resulting from this first-stage regression provide measures of workers’ earnings that 
are purged of province-specific business cycle effects and province-specific trends in earnings. 
We then regress these residuals yit using the following econometric specification, employed by 
Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) and Stevens (1997): 
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where yit denotes the (first-stage regression) adjusted annual earnings of worker i in year t, Xit is 
a vector of observable worker characteristics, Dit
k is a vector of dummy variables that equal 1 if 
worker i is displaced k years prior to year t (and Dit
k=0 otherwise), αi is a vector of person-
specific fixed effects, ωit are worker-specific time-trends and εit is an error term. Since displaced 
workers might be less skilled than other workers, they might have had, in the absence of 
displacement, lower earnings and slower earnings growth than non-displaced workers. Therefore, 
it is crucial to allow both the intercept and the slope of the age-earnings profiles of displaced 
workers to differ from those of other workers. Because it includes both person-specific fixed 




It must be emphasized that when we estimate fixed-effects models (αi≠ 0; ωi=0) or models with 
person-specific time trends (αi≠ 0; ωi≠0), many worker characteristics, such as education, visible 
minority status, immigration status, immigrants’ country of origin are eliminated from equation 
(1) since they do not vary over time. Hence, while the absence of the aforementioned variables in 
our data set precludes separate analyses by, say, workers’ education level or visible minority 
status, it does not prevent us from estimating flexible econometric models that allow workers’ 
heterogeneity to influence both intercepts and earnings growth rates, a pattern documented by 
Baker (1997).  
  
Since there is evidence that the earnings of displaced workers start to fall substantially at least 
three years before displacement (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993: 687), we specify a= -3. 
In order to allow displacement to affect earnings over several years, we specify b = 5. Thus, we 
allow displacement to affect workers’ earnings up to three years before and up to five years after 
it occurred.  
 
IV.1 Displacements experienced by high-seniority workers 
 
We start our analyses by focusing on displacements experienced by high-seniority workers, 
which we define as those who have been in the same firm for five years or more. The rationale 
for focusing on these workers is that concerns regarding job losses often concentrate on workers 
with substantial seniority, for whom layoffs through firm closures may imply the loss of firm-
specific skills and for whom re-employment and training may prove difficult (Kletzer, 1998). As 
mentioned above, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) suggest that long-term earnings losses 
for this group of displaced workers are substantial. 
 
                                                            
7.  Fixed effects models (αi≠ 0; ωi=0) are estimated by regressing deviations from person-specific means in our 
residuals (yit)  on  deviations from person-specific means in our explanatory variables. Models with person-
specific time trends (αi≠ 0; ωi≠0) are estimated in two steps. First, we take first-differences in our residuals yit 
and in our explanatory variables.  Second, we express these first-differences in terms of deviations from person-
specific means and regress the resulting transformed dependent variables on the resulting transformed 
regressors. 
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When analyzing displacement for high-seniority employees, we select a sample of displaced 
workers that consists of 10 cohorts of individuals who: a) were displaced through firm closures 
(or through firm closures and mass layoffs) that took place in the commercial sector between 
1988 and 1997, b) were aged 25 to 49 at the time of displacement, and c) had 5 years of seniority 
or more at the time of displacement.
8  We follow each of these 10 cohorts for a period of time 
that starts in 1988 and ends 5 years after displacement, at which point they will be aged at most 
54.
9 We impose the aforementioned age restrictions in order to ensure that workers’ earnings 




For both definitions of displacement, we consider two sub-samples of displaced workers. The 
first consists of individuals who have positive earnings in all five years following displacement. 
Because it excludes displaced workers who had no earnings at some point after displacement as a 
result of long-term unemployment, this narrow sub-sample focuses on the experiences of the 
most successful displaced individuals. 
 
Our second sub-sample of displaced workers is broader, since it allows displaced workers to have 
no earnings at some point after displacement, while requiring them to have positive earnings in 
the fifth year following displacement. By allowing displaced workers to have no earnings in 
some of the years following displacement, we take into account the possibility that displacement 
may lead to long-term unemployment and/or temporary withdrawals from the labour force. As 
long as temporary withdrawals from the labour force are induced by a discouraged worker effect 
(rather than an exogenous increase in individuals’ preferences for leisure), they will reflect 
workers’ difficulty of adjusting to job loss and thus, should be considered when quantifying the 
magnitude of the earnings losses. Since displaced workers who never have positive earnings after 
displacement may have moved into self-employment permanently, left the country or died, and 
since our data set contains no information that allows us to distinguish these three scenarios, we 





Our comparison group consists of workers who: a) were aged 25 to 40 in 1988, b) had positive 
earnings throughout the 1983 to 2002 period, and c) never experienced a permanent layoff during 
                                                            
8.   Displaced workers are allowed to move from the commercial sector to the public sector in the years following 
displacement. 
 
9.   For instance, our regressions will use data covering the 1988 to 1993 period for the 1988 cohort and data 
covering the 1988 to 2002 period for the 1997 cohort.  Because we allow displacement to affect earnings up to 
five years after its occurrence, we need five years of data prior to 1988 to construct our indicators of post-
displacement. Since the Longitudinal Worker File (LWF) starts in 1983, this implies that data covering the 1983 
to 1987 period cannot be used in our regression analyses.  
 
10.  For the same reason, earnings data observed six years or more after displacement are not used in the regression 
analysis. 
 
11.  Note that by doing so, we also exclude displaced workers who withdraw permanently from the labour force and 
those who remain unemployed permanently after displacement. Our inability to distinguish long-term 
unemployment spells from withdrawals from the labour market is due to the fact that the LWF—like many 
administrative data sets—contains no information on workers’ labour force status. 
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the 1983 to 2002 period.
12 The earnings trajectories observed for these workers during the 1988 
to 2002 period are used in our regression analyses.
13
 
    
For our comparison group and the two sub-samples of high-seniority displaced workers, we 
further restrict our attention to individuals who: a) never lived outside the 10 provinces during 




  All analyses are conducted for men and women separately. 
Our main interest in this paper is to quantify the magnitude of the earnings losses that Canadian 
workers incur as a result of firm closures or mass layoffs, whether or not these earnings losses 
result from multiple job losses. For this reason, we choose not to control for the subsequent 
displacements that workers may incur while they adjust to the first displacement they 
experienced between 1988 and 1997. As Stevens (1997) shows, multiple job losses are one 
reason why displaced workers suffer substantial earnings losses in the long run.  
 
IV.2 Displacements experienced by all workers 
 
Subsequently, we analyze the consequences of displacements for all displaced workers, whatever 
their level of seniority is. When doing so, our sample of displaced workers and our comparison 
group are the same as those defined in Section IV.1, with the exception that displaced workers 
are no longer required to have five years of seniority or more with their employer.  
 
V.  Descriptive evidence  
   
In Table 1, we show what percentage of workers aged 25 to 49 have been displaced or 
permanently laid-off between 1988 and 2002.
15 During that period, permanent layoff rates varied 
between 6.6% and 9.1% for men and between 3.4% and 5.3% for women. Displacement rates 
due to firm closures were lower and suggest that roughly one permanently laid-off worker out of 
10 lost his job through firm closures over the last two decades.
16
                                                            
12.  Note that we select for our comparison group an age interval, as defined in 1988 (25 to 40), that is narrower than 
that used for our sample of displaced workers at the time of displacement (25 to 49). We do so in order to ensure 
that the two groups have similar age distributions, as will be shown below. 
  The implication is that 
displaced workers, defined narrowly as employees who are permanently laid-off through firm 
closures, represent a relatively small group of individuals. Over the 1988 to 2002 period, between 
23,000 and 44,000 males aged 25 to 49 were displaced in a given year. For women in the same 
age group, the corresponding numbers are 11,000 and 18,000. Including workers aged 50 to 64 
  
13.  We require workers in the comparison group to have experienced no layoffs between 1983 and 1987 (as well as 
between 1988 and 2002) because we do not want their earnings in 1988 to be affected by previous layoffs. 
  
14.  However, we allow individuals to move between provinces over time.  We also require displaced workers to be 
employed in firms with at least two employees, in order to exclude incorporated self-employed individuals with 
no paid help, who would issue a T4 slip for themselves. 
 
15.  Workers are defined as permanently laid-off when they do not return to their former employer in the same year 
or in the year following the layoff.  
 
16.  This conclusion also holds for workers aged 50 to 64. See Appendix Table 1. 
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(Appendix 1)  and pooling both sexes, the Longitudinal Worker File  estimates that, among 
employees aged 25 to 64, an average of 55,000 workers were displaced per year through firm 
closures between 1988 and 2002.   
 
Since workers may be displaced not only through firm closures, but also through mass layoffs 
that do not lead to firm closures, we also present displacement rates using a broader definition of 
displacement that captures both sets of events. When we move from a definition of displacement 
that includes only job losses due to firm closures to a broader definition that adds mass layoffs to 
firm closures, estimates of the number of displaced workers double. Of all employees aged 25 to 
64, an average of roughly 110,000 were displaced through firm closures or mass layoffs during 
the 1988 to 2002 period.   
 
Table 2 shows how displacement rates varied across a certain number of dimensions in 2002. 
Important differences are observed across firm sizes. Men and women employed in small firms 
(those employing between 2 and 19 workers) are much more likely to lose their job through firm 
closures than their counterparts employed in large firms (those with 500 or more employees). 
Since many large firms consist of multiple establishments and since the LWF cannot identify 
establishment deaths, differences in displacement rates, measured across firm sizes, might exceed 
differences in displacement rates measured across establishment sizes.
17
 
  If so, using a definition 
of displacement that includes mass layoffs would tend to reduce differences across firm sizes. 
This is indeed what happens when we consider our broader definition of displacement. 
Displacement rates also differ by industry. Construction workers and those employed in 
agriculture, forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction industries have greater chances of being 
displaced than other workers. 
 
In Table 3, we examine how many displaced workers have 5 years of seniority or more. The data 
suggest that every year, between 2,300 and 3,400 high-seniority males between the ages of 25 
and 49 lost their job through firm closures during the 1990s. For women, the corresponding 
numbers vary between 1,200 and 1,900. Using a broader definition of displacement indicates that 
between 5,500 and 13,000 high-seniority men aged 25 to 49 lost their job through firm closures 
or mass layoffs during the 1990s. The corresponding numbers for their female counterparts vary 
between 3,200 and 4,900. 
 
Selected characteristics of high-seniority displaced workers and of the comparison group, as 
measured in 1987, are presented in Table 4. Men and women in our samples of displaced 
workers have very similar mean and median ages, as compared to their counterparts in the 
comparison group. However, the annual earnings of displaced individuals are markedly lower 
than those of individuals in the comparison group. This simple fact highlights the need to control 
for heterogeneity in worker’s age-earnings profiles, either through fixed-effects models or 
through models with worker-specific trends, both of which are incorporated in equation (1). 
 
                                                            
17.  For instance, if a manufacturing firm that consists of two establishments employing each 100 workers sees one 
of its plants close, displacement rates defined at the establishment level will be positive among establishments 
with 100 to 499 employees but will amount to zero, when defined at the firm level, among firms with 100 to 499 
employees.   
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In Figures 1 and 2, we show the earnings trajectories of two cohorts of high-seniority males: a) 
those who were displaced through firm closures in 1989 and, b) those who were displaced 
through firm closures in 1997. The earnings trajectories are shown using either a narrow sub-
sample of displaced workers who have positive earnings in all five years following displacement 
(Figure 1) or the broader sub-sample of displaced workers defined in the previous section (Figure 
2).   
 
A comparison of the earnings paths of the two cohorts clearly indicates that the degree to which 
earnings recover after displacement depends on labour market conditions. Specifically, earnings 
recovery is much slower for males who were displaced right before the 1990 to 1992 recession 
(the 1989 cohort) than for their counterparts who were displaced during an expansionary period 
(the 1997 cohort). This is true for both sub-samples. More important, five years after 
displacement, earnings of workers displaced in 1989 are no higher than they were in 1988. 
Combined with the fact that earnings of this cohort were trending upwards prior to displacement, 
this suggests that, in the absence of displacement, the annual earnings of the 1989 cohort would 
have been substantially higher in 1994 than they actually were. If so, earnings losses for the 1989 
cohort should be substantial, even five years after displacement. A visual inspection of Figures 1 
and 2 suggests that the extent to which such a conclusion can be made for the 1997 cohort is 
unclear and depends on the magnitude of the earnings growth assumed in the absence of 
displacement. Clearly, both Figures 1 and 2 highlight the need to take account of the labour 
market conditions that prevail after displacement. We do so in our first-stage estimation 
procedure by inserting a full set of province-year interactions. 
 
VI.  Regression results – Displacements due to firm closures  
 
In this section, we use the econometric approach outlined in Section III to quantify the magnitude 
of the average earnings losses experienced in the short run and in the longer run by male and 
female employees who lost their job during the late 1980s and the 1990s as a result of firm 
closures. We first document the earnings losses of high-seniority displaced workers and then 
consider all workers displaced through firm closures. In all our regressions, the vector Xit used in 
equation (1) simply consists of a quadratic term in age. 
 
VI.1 High-seniority displaced workers 
     
Table 5 shows the regression results for high-seniority workers who lost their job through firm 
closures between 1988 and 1997. Results are presented using fixed-effects models, models with 
worker-specific trends, and models estimated using a narrow sub-sample of displaced workers as 
well as a broader sub-sample. This leads to four combinations of model specification and sample 
selections. 
 
Consistent with Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), our multivariate analyses suggest that 
earnings start to fall before displacement occurs. The timing and the magnitude of the earnings 
decline prior to displacement varies between fixed-effects models and models with worker-
specific trends: the latter set of models generally indicates greater losses prior to displacement. 
Depending on the choice of the econometric models and the sub-sample used, the earnings losses 
of displaced males in the year of displacement vary between $9,000 and $12,600 (in 2000$). For  
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women, the corresponding numbers are $7,100 and $7,900. For both sexes, earnings losses in the 
year following displacement are even greater.  
 
In virtually all cases, earnings recovery after displacement is very modest. Five years after 
displacement, the earnings losses for our narrow sub-sample of displaced men amount to roughly 
$6,600 with the fixed-effects models and to about $9,600 with models that allow person-specific 
trends in workers’ age-earnings profiles. Using our broader sub-sample of displaced men yields 
estimates of 5-year earnings losses  that vary between $8,500 (in fixed-effects models) and 
$11,600 (in models with worker-specific trends). Since pre-displacement earnings—defined as 
annual earnings received in year t-4—of high-seniority males in our narrow and broader sub-
samples averaged $34,487 and $34,715, respectively, these numbers suggest that the long-term 
(i.e., 5-year) earnings losses of high-tenure displaced men represent: a) between 19% and 28% of 
pre-displacement earnings in our narrow sub-sample,  and b) between 25% and 34% of pre-
displacement earnings in our broader sub-sample.  Thus, earnings losses of high-seniority 
displaced men are substantial and persistent. 
 
The same qualitative conclusions hold for women. Five years after displacement, earnings losses 
of high-seniority female employees represent: a) between 23% and 29% of pre-displacement 
earnings in our narrow sub-sample, and b) between 35% and 37% of pre-displacement earnings 




These numbers are of the same order of magnitude as those reported by Jacobson, Lalonde and 
Sullivan (1993) for a sample of Pennsylvania workers displaced during the 1980s. Five years 
after separating from their former employer, workers in that U.S. region who were displaced 
through mass layoffs experienced earnings losses that amounted to roughly 25% of their pre-
displacement earnings.   
 
In Table 6, we investigate how long-term earnings losses—losses experienced five years after 
displacement—vary across population subgroups. For both men and women, we estimate 
separate models for workers who, at the time of displacement, were: a) aged 25 to 34, b) aged 35 
to 49, c) employed in manufacturing, d) employed outside manufacturing, e) employed in firms 
with 100 employees or less, and f) employed in firms with more than 100 employees.
19
 
   
For women aged 25 to 34, workers aged 35 to 49, women employed outside manufacturing or 
those employed in firms with 100 employees or less, fixed effects models and models with 
worker-specific trends yield fairly similar estimates of long-term earnings losses. For instance, 
they suggest that displaced  men  aged 35 to 49  experience, in our broad sample, long-term 
                                                            
18.  Pre-displacement earnings of high-seniority women in the narrow and broad sub-samples averaged $20,211 and 
$20,383, respectively. 
 
19.  For these population subgroups, the comparison groups selected differ from those used in Section IV.1. For 
displaced workers aged 25 to 34 (35 to 49), the comparison group is aged 25 to 30 (35 to 40) in 1988. For 
displaced workers employed in manufacturing (outside manufacturing), the comparison group consists of 
workers aged 25 to 40 in 1988 and who were employed in manufacturing (outside manufacturing) in 1988. For 
displaced workers employed in firms with at most 100 employees (more than 100 employees), the comparison 
group consists of workers aged 25 to 40 in 1988 and who were employed in firms with at most 100 employees 
(more than 100 employees) in 1988. For displaced workers aged 25 to 34 (35 to 49), very similar results were 
obtained when using workers aged 25 to 32 (33 to 40) in 1988 as a comparison group.   
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earnings losses that represent between 22% and 26% of pre-displacement earnings. For their 
female counterparts, the corresponding estimates vary between 32% and 35%. 
 
In contrast, estimates of long-term earnings losses differ by 10  percentage points or more, 
depending on the econometric models used, among men aged 25 to 34, manufacturing workers, 
men employed outside manufacturing and  men employed in firms with more than 100 
employees. For all these subgroups, models with person-specific trends yield larger estimates of 
long-term losses than fixed effects, thereby suggesting that the assumption (underlying fixed-
effects models) that age-earnings profiles of displaced workers have the same slope as those of 
workers in the comparison group is, for these subgroups, invalid. 
 
More important, in most subgroups and econometric models considered, the results of Table 6 
indicate that long-term earnings losses of displaced workers amount to at least 20% of pre-
displacement earnings. Thus, the large long-term earnings losses that high-seniority displaced 
workers suffer as a result of firm closures appear to be pervasive. 
 
VI.2 All displaced workers 
 
While  they are of high interest for reasons outlined above, high-seniority displaced workers 
represent a fairly small fraction of all workers displaced through firm closures (Table 3). In this 
context, it is worth broadening our perspective on the consequences of displacement and ask the 
following question: on average, what is the magnitude of the earnings losses experienced by 
workers who lose their job through firm closures? 
 
We answer this question in Table 7. Like for high-seniority workers, there is evidence  that 
earnings start to fall prior to displacement. Moreover, earnings losses reach their maximum in the 
year following firm closures. However, a comparison of Tables 5 and 7 reveals that average 
earnings losses experienced by displaced workers in the year following displacement are smaller 
than they are for the subset of high-seniority displaced workers: earnings losses experienced by 
the former group represent between 33% and 81% of those experienced by the latter.  
 
While both fixed-effects models and models with worker-specific trends indicate that long-term 
earnings losses of high-seniority workers are substantial, this conclusion no longer holds when 
we consider all workers displaced through firm closures. Fixed-effects models suggest large 
earnings losses five years after displacement. They indicate that these losses represent between 
16% and 22% of pre-displacement earnings for men and between 25% and 34% of pre-
displacement earnings for women.
20
 
 In contrast, models with worker-specific trends indicate that 
earnings losses, whenever they happen, are no longer statistically significant at conventional 
levels more than three years after displacement. 
In sum, workers who lose their job through firm closures clearly experience short-term earnings 
losses. Whether they also suffer earnings losses in the long run depends critically on the 
econometric specification chosen. 
 
                                                            
20.  Annual earnings of displaced males in year t-4 average $28,212 and $27,858 in the narrow sub-samples and the 
broad sub-samples, respectively. For women, the corresponding numbers are $16,928 and $16,700.  
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VII. Regression results – Displacements due to firm closures or mass layoffs  
 
Admittedly, worker displacement can occur not only through firm closures, but also through 
mass layoffs that do not lead to firm closures. In single-establishment companies, mass layoffs 
sometimes lead to big employment losses without necessarily leading to the death of these 
companies. In multi-establishment companies, mass layoffs may lead to the closure of one of the 
establishments formerly in operation. Since mass layoffs that do not cause firm closures are not 
captured in our initial definition of displacement, we now broaden our definition of displacement 
and consider both workers who are displaced through firm closures and those who are displaced 
through mass layoffs that do not lead to firm closures. 
 
VII.1  High-seniority displaced workers 
 
When adding mass layoffs to the definition of displacement we use for high-seniority workers, 
we add high-tenure employees who were permanently laid-off in year t from firms that: a) had 50 
or more employees in year t-4 and, b) experienced a drop in employment of 30% or more 
between t-4 and t+1.
21
 
 Our comparison group is the same as that defined in Section IV.1.  
The results are presented in Table 8. They confirm those of Table 5, i.e., long-term earnings 
losses of high-seniority displaced workers are substantial. For displaced men in the narrow sub-
sample, long-term earnings losses vary between $7,100 and $10,900, thereby representing 
between 18% and 28% of pre-displacement earnings. For those in the broad sub-sample, the 
corresponding numbers vary between $9,700 and $13,700 (i.e., between 25% and 35% of pre-
displacement earnings). 
 
For women in the narrow sub-sample, long-term earnings losses represent between 24% and 26% 
of pre-displacement earnings. For those in the broad sub-sample, they represent about 35% of 
pre-displacement earnings. 
 
In Table 9, we replicate Table 6. All of the estimates of long-term earnings losses shown in Table 
9 are statistically significant at the 5% level. Once again, our conclusion that earnings losses of 
high-seniority workers are substantial and persistent holds for most population subgroups 
considered. One difference worth noting is that estimates of long-term earnings losses for 
workers employed in firms with more than 100 employees have a much smaller dispersion when 
we consider our broader definition of displacement than we use our initial  definition.  For 
example, when we consider displaced males in the narrow sub-sample, these estimates vary 
between 13% and 38% in Table 6 (using our initial definition of displacement) and between 15% 
and 22% in Table 9 (using our broader definition of displacement). One possible explanation for 
this difference is that including mass layoffs will  likely increase markedly the number of 




VII.2    All displaced workers 
 
                                                            
21.  We also require the firm to be the main employer of the worker in year t-4 (i.e., to provide the greatest annual 
earnings during that year).  
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When adding mass layoffs to the definition of displacement we use for all displaced workers, we 
add employees who worked for a given firm in both year t-1 and year t and were permanently 
laid-off in year t from this firm. We require these firms to have: a) had 50 or more employees in 




comparison group is the same as that defined in Section IV.1.  
Table 10 replicates Table 7. As was the case with our initial definition of displacement (i.e., 
displacement due to firm closures), fixed effects models indicate that workers displaced through 
firm closures or mass layoffs experience substantial earnings losses five years after displacement.  
 
However, contrary to the results obtained with our initial definition of displacement, models with 
worker-specific trends also suggest the presence of non-negligible long-term earnings losses. 
Although these are more moderate than those obtained with fixed-effects models, they represent 
between 9% and 16% of pre-displacement earnings for men and between 12% and 22% of pre-
displacement earnings for women, depending on the sub-sample considered. 
 
Taken together, both models suggest that long-term earnings losses of displaced males represent 
between 9% and 15% of pre-displacement earnings in the narrow sub-sample, and between 16% 
and 22% of pre-displacement earnings in the broad sub-sample. For women, the corresponding 
ranges of estimates are 12% to 21% and 22% to 31%, respectively. 
 
Thus, defining displaced workers as individuals who lose their job through firm closures or mass 
layoffs yields an unambiguous conclusion regarding the long-term earnings losses experienced 
on average by these workers: whatever models and sub-samples are considered, these losses are 
non-negligible but are more moderate than those experienced by high-seniority workers.   
  
VIII.  Summary 
 
Table 11 summarizes our findings regarding the magnitude of the earnings losses experienced 
five years after displacement. Four  points are worth noting. First, for a given definition of 
displacement and a given sub-sample (narrow versus broad), fixed effects models produce very 
similar estimates of long-term earnings losses across  categories  of displaced workers (high- 
seniority displaced workers versus all displaced workers).  
 
Second, for a given sub-sample and a given category of displaced workers, changing the 
definition of displacement does not alter much the estimates of long-term earnings losses 
obtained from fixed-effects models. The same conclusion does not hold for models with worker-
specific trends when all displaced workers are considered. However, when the focus is on high-
seniority workers, changing the definition of displacement does not much alter the estimates of 
long-term earnings losses obtained from models with worker-specific trends. Hence, conditional 
on model specification, results regarding high-seniority workers are extremely robust to 
definitional choice. 
 
Third, for high-seniority workers, moving from fixed-effects models to models with worker-
specific trends increases long-term earnings losses for men but decreases them slightly or leaves 
them unchanged for women. In contrast, moving from fixed-effects models to models with 
                                                            
22.  We also require the firm to be the main employer of the worker in year t-1.  
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worker-specific trends decreases the magnitude of the long-term earnings losses when the focus 
is on all displaced workers. This is especially true when the first definition of displacement is 
considered. 
 
Fourth, inspection of the results reveals that when we consider all displaced workers, estimates 
derived from our broader definition of displacement are much more robust to model specification 
than those derived from our first and, admittedly narrower, definition of displacement.  For 
instance, estimates of long-term earnings losses, as a percentage of pre-displacement earnings, 
differ by only 6 percentage points for displaced males in the narrow sub-sample when using the 
broader definition. This is much less than the 20 percentage-point difference observed for this 
group when using the first definition. When we consider high-seniority workers, the broader 
definition is as robust to model specification as the first one. Since the broader definition is, on 
conceptual grounds, superior to the first one—displacement may result not only from firm 
closures but also from mass layoffs that do not lead to firm closures—it is reassuring to note that 
our estimates of long-term earnings losses are generally more robust when using this definition 
than the first one. 
 
Using this broader definition, long-term earnings losses of high-seniority displaced males 
represent between 18% and 35% of pre-displacement earnings. For their female counterparts, the 
corresponding numbers vary between 24% and 35%. When considering all displaced men, the 
interval of losses is 9% to 22%, as compared to 12% to 31% for all displaced women. 
 
It should be emphasized that these numbers represent average losses for workers who have been 
displaced between 1987 and 1997. As was shown in Figures 1 and 2, it is conceivable that the 
earnings losses of displaced workers vary depending on labour market conditions. To investigate 
this issue, we re-estimated the fixed effects models of Table 8 and allowed the displacement 
dummies to be interacted with a binary indicator that was equal to 1 if a worker was displaced 
between 1993 and 1997, 0 otherwise.  
 
The results clearly confirmed that workers displaced during the 1987 to 1992 period suffered 
much larger earnings losses than their counterparts who lost their job during the 1993 to 1997 
period. Whatever samples were considered, high-seniority male and female workers who were 
displaced during the first period experienced, five years after displacement, earnings losses that 
were between $5,300 and $5,800 higher than those experienced by their counterparts who were 
displaced during the second period.   For example, in our narrow (broad) sample, long-term 
earnings losses of high-seniority males who were displaced between 1987 and 1992 averaged 
roughly $11,300 ($14,300), much more than the losses of about $6,100 ($8,700) suffered by 
those who were displaced between 1993 and 1997. Similarly, long-term earnings losses of high-
seniority females who were displaced between 1987 and 1992 averaged roughly $11,000 
($12,600), much more than the losses of about $5,100 ($7,000) suffered by their counterparts 
who were displaced between 1993 and 1997. 
 
Similar qualitative conclusions were obtained when re-estimating the fixed effects models of 
Table 10. Whatever samples were considered, male (female) workers displaced between 1987 
and 1992 suffered long-term earnings losses that were between $2,600 and $3,000 (between 
$1,500 and $1,700) higher than those experienced by their counterparts who were displaced 
between 1993 and 1997.  
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IX.  Conclusion 
 
Over the 1988 to 2002 period, an average of 110,000 Canadian workers aged 25 to 64 lost their 
job through firm closures  or mass layoffs. What happened  to these workers’ earnings after 
displacement is an important question that has received relatively little attention in Canada so far. 
The contribution of this paper is to fill this gap, using a unique longitudinal data set that allows 
us to select workers who were permanently laid-off in the year their company shut down or 
suffered severe employment reductions. 
 
Our main finding is that while the long-term earnings losses experienced on average by workers 
who are displaced through firm closures or mass layoffs are important, those experienced by 
displaced workers with considerable seniority appear to be even more substantial. Consistent 
with findings from the United States by Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), high-seniority 
displaced men experience long-term earnings losses that represent between 18% and 35% of their 
pre-displacement earnings. For their female counterparts, the corresponding estimates vary 
between 24% and 35%. 
 
Several limitations should be noted. We did not take into account the possibility that displaced 
workers may use self-employment as a mechanism to mitigate the income losses they incur as a 
result of displacement. Our inability to do so results from the fact that the Longitudinal Worker 
File contains no information on self-employment income. Nevertheless, our results shed light on 
an important issue: the extent to which income from paid employment recovers after 
displacement. Assessing whether employees receive lower wages and salaries after displacement 
is a question of interest to policymakers, whether or not displaced workers offset the drop in 
their income from paid employment through self-employment income.  
 
While we have shown that high-seniority displaced workers suffer substantial earnings losses 
even five years after displacement, we did not investigate the mechanisms that explain their slow 
earnings recovery. While empirical work by Stevens (1997) suggest that multiple job losses 
following displacement might be an important contributing factor, the degree to which mobility 
patterns across industries and firm sizes improves workers’ chances of enjoying strong earnings 
recovery remains unknown. Likewise, the extent to which various search methods are effective in 
fostering strong earnings recovery has not been assessed. 
 
Despite these limitations, our results confirm an important finding of previous U.S. studies: high-
seniority workers who are displaced either through mass layoffs or firm closures suffer earnings 
losses that are substantial and persistent and thus, likely experience a permanent drop in income.  
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Table 1a  Displacement rates and permanent layoff rates of aged 25 to 49,
1 1988 to 2002
             Men              Women
Permanent Displacement rates Permanent Displacement rates 
layoff rates layoff rates
Firm Firm Firm Firm
closures closures + closures closures +
mass layoffs mass layoffs
percentage
1988 8.2 0.8 1.6 4.5 0.5 0.7
1989 7.6 0.8 1.5 4.0 0.5 0.7
1990 9.0 1.1 2.2 4.8 0.6 1.0
1991 9.1 0.8 2.3 4.9 0.5 1.0
1992 8.9 0.9 2.4 4.7 0.5 1.0
1993 8.2 0.7 1.7 4.4 0.4 0.8
1994 7.8 0.7 1.6 4.1 0.4 0.9
1995 7.7 0.7 1.4 4.0 0.4 0.8
1996 7.5 0.7 1.3 4.0 0.4 0.8
1997 7.4 0.7 1.1 4.1 0.4 0.7
1998 7.4 0.7 1.3 4.0 0.4 0.7
1999 7.0 0.6 1.1 3.8 0.4 0.7
2000 6.6 0.6 1.1 3.4 0.4 0.6
2001 8.3 0.7 1.8 5.3 0.5 1.1
2002 7.8 0.6 1.3 4.8 0.4 0.8
Table 1b  Estimated number of workers displaced or permanently laid-off workers aged 25 to 49,
1 1988 to 2002
             Men              Women
Permanently Permanently
laid-off laid-off
Firm Firm Firm Firm
closures closures + closures closures +
mass layoffs mass layoffs
1988 309,760 30,220 60,441 125,000 13,890 19,446
1989 296,700 31,230 58,560 117,410 14,680 20,548
1990 357,220 43,660 87,320 146,510 18,310 30,523
1991 358,840 31,550 90,697 150,890 15,400 30,794
1992 346,740 35,060 93,503 144,600 15,380 30,767
1993 319,250 27,250 66,187 135,930 12,360 24,714
1994 308,020 27,640 63,184 129,050 12,590 28,328
1995 308,340 28,030 56,061 129,100 12,910 25,821
1996 303,930 28,370 52,682 131,860 13,190 26,372
1997 308,660 29,200 45,883 142,940 13,950 24,405
1998 314,140 29,720 55,186 146,340 14,630 25,610
1999 301,500 25,840 47,379 144,530 15,210 26,625
2000 290,540 26,410 48,482 134,540 15,830 23,783
2001 319,410 26,940 69,273 150,080 14,160 31,149
2002 300,150 23,090 50,025 136,610 11,380 22,769
1. Employed outside public services in firms with at least two employees.
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal Worker File.
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Table 2  Displacement rates of workers aged 25 to 49, by selected characteristics, 2002
1
           Displacement due to
       Firm closures +
       Firm closures        mass layoffs
Men Women Men Women
percentage
Overall 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.8
Age
25 to 29 years 0.7 0.4 1.4 0.7
30 to 34 years 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.8
35 to 39 years 0.6 0.4 1.2 0.8
40 to 44 years 0.6 0.4 1.2 0.8
45 to 49 years 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.8
Firm size
2 to 19 employees 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.1
20 to 99 employees 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.1
100 to 499 employees 0.4 0.3 1.5 0.9
500 or more employees 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4
Region
Atlantic Provinces 1.1 0.7 1.9 1.4
Quebec 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.8
Ontario 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.6
Manitoba 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.7
Saskchewan 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.7
Alberta 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.7
British Columbia 0.8 0.6 1.8 1.0
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction 1.1 0.9 2.7 2.0
Utilities 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5
Construction 1.4 0.8 3.1 1.5
Manufacturing 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.2
Trade 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6
Transportation and warehouse 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.6
Finance, insurance, real estate and leasing 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.4
Professional, scientific and technical services 0.9 0.5 1.4 0.9
Business, building and other support services 0.6 0.4 1.4 0.9
Information, cultural and recreation 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.7
Accomodation and food services 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9
Other services 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5
1. Employed outside public services in firms with at least two employees.
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal Worker File.   
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Table 3  Estimated number of displaced workers aged 25 to 49, by seniority, 1988 to 2002
1
Workers displaced through firm closures
All With at least All With at least
5 years of seniority 5 years of seniority
1988 30,220 1,980 13,890 960
1989 31,230 1,480 14,680 980
1990 43,660 3,130 18,310 1,470
1991 31,550 3,420 15,400 1,410
1992 35,060 3,200 15,380 1,730
1993 27,250 2,740 12,360 1,200
1994 27,640 2,820 12,590 1,310
1995 28,030 2,270 12,910 1,440
1996 28,370 2,500 13,190 1,600
1997 29,200 2,090 13,950 1,580
1998 29,720 2,450 14,630 1,870
1999 25,840 2,380 15,210 1,680
2000 26,410 2,580 15,830 1,830
2001 26,940 2,590 14,160 1,460
2002 23,090 2,340 11,380 1,400
Workers displaced through firm closures or mass layoffs
All With at least All With at least
5 years of seniority 5 years of seniority
1988 60,441 10,820 19,446 2,570
1989 58,560 3,860 20,548 1,870
1990 87,320 9,440 30,523 3,150
1991 90,697 10,620 30,794 4,590
1992 93,503 13,030 30,767 4,860
1993 66,187 8,830 24,714 4,400
1994 63,184 7,410 28,328 3,800
1995 56,061 6,370 25,821 3,550
1996 52,682 7,650 26,372 3,900
1997 45,883 5,460 24,405 4,100
1998 55,186 6,010 25,610 4,390
1999 47,379 5,890 26,625 4,250
2000 48,482 5,880 23,783 3,840
2001 69,273 8,920 31,149 4,030
2002 50,025 6,070 22,769 3,530
1. Employed outside public services in firms with at least two employees.
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Table 4  Selected characteristics, in 1987, of high-seniority workers displaced through firm closures 
                between 1988 and 1997





Mean 31 31 32
Median 31 31 32
10th percentile 22 22 26
90th percentile 41 41 38
Annual earnings (in 2000$)
Mean 31,989 32,060 45,880
Median 31,060 30,947 45,153
10th percentile 10,125 9,836 25,794
90th percentile 53,053 53,643 66,452
Sample size (persons)
Positive earnings in 1987 1,795 2,157 87,583
Used for regression analysis 1,828 2,196 87,583





Mean 33 32 32
Median 33 32 32
10th percentile 22 23 25
90th percentile 42 42 38
Annual earnings (in 2000$)
Mean 18,958 18,629 31,152
Median 18,061 17,650 29,924
10th percentile 4,689 4,456 13,541
90th percentile 32,632 32,492 49,607
Sample size (persons)
Positive earnings in 1987 807 1,021 73,780
Used for regression analysis 844 1,068 73,780
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal Worker File. 
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Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -5 206 -53 -18
(298) (292) (316) (277)
2 years before -459 -325 -665 -838
(332) (316) (345) (315)
1 year before -1,895 -1,847 -1,524 -1,880
(348) (334) (368) (337)
Year of displacement -9,047 -9,823 -7,059 -7,845
(407) (394) (433) (396)
1 year after -10,707 -14,407 -8,591 -11,531
(443) (472) (468) (458)
2 years after -8,121 -11,987 -6,485 -9,527
(439) (474) (467) (458)
3 years after -7,487 -10,837 -6,404 -9,163
(442) (463) (453) (446)
4 years after -7,035 -10,024 -6,011 -8,307
(452) (466) (477) (456)
5 years after -6,618 -8,506 -5,751 -7,542
(473) (464) (496) (462)
Models with worker-specific trends
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -1,614 -1,559 -240 -266
(334) (309) (286) (248)
2 years before -2,726 -2,680 -883 -1,132
(501) (458) (412) (366)
1 year before -4,254 -4,305 -1,604 -2,029
(656) (605) (533) (479)
Year of displacement -11,816 -12,596 -7,061 -7,947
(844) (784) (705) (658)
1 year after -13,409 -17,143 -8,322 -11,457
(1001) (948) (863) (829)
2 years after -10,810 -14,738 -5,975 -9,306
(1159) (1099) (993) (948)
3 years after -10,218 -13,656 -5,684 -8,824
(1323) (1241) (1096) (1054)
4 years after -9,864 -12,964 -5,112 -7,879
(1478) (1383) (1243) (1184)
5 years after -9,599 -11,619 -4,703 -7,055
(1650) (1539) (1383) (1307)
1. Standard errors, adjusted for the clustering of observations by individuals, are between parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.
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Table 6  Long-term earnings losses (in 2000$) of high-seniority workers displaced through firm closures
               – Various subgroups
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
sample sample sample sample
Aged 25 to 34
Fixed-effects models -5,410 -7,327 -4,818 -6,323
[-18.2] [-24.9] [-25.4] [-32.7]
Models with trends -11,260 -13,126 -3,958 -5,340
[-37.8] [-44.5] [-20.9] [-27.6]
Aged 35 to 49
Fixed-effects models -6,572 -8,518 -5,428 -7,420
[-17.3] [-22.1] [-26.0] [-35.4]
Models with trends -7,873 10,005 -4,037 -6,749
[-20.7] [-25.9] [-19.3] [-32.2]
Employed in manufacturing
Fixed-effects models -7,762 -9,323 -6,107 -7,993
[-23.1] [-28.1] [-29.9] [-39.5]
Models with trends -11,112 -13,919 -8,385 -10,428
[-33.1] [-42.0] [-41.1] [-51.5]
Employed outside manufacturing
Fixed-effects models -6,303 -8,323 -5,245 -6,873
[-18.0] [-23.4] [-26.1] [-33.6]
Models with trends -10,460 -12,261 -5,012 -7,459
[-29.9] [-34.4] [-24.9] [-36.5]
Employed in firms with <=100 employees
Fixed-effects models -6,252 -8,017 -5,339 -7,001
[-18.4] [-23.5] [-26.9] [-35.2]
Models with trends -8,514 -10,719 -5,461 -7,713
[-25.0] [-31.4] [-27.5] [-38.8]
Employed in firms with >100 employees
Fixed-effects models -4,664 -6,484 -5,378 -7,304
[-12.8] [-17.4] [-25.1] [-33.2]
Models with trends -13,762 -15,142 -3,479 -5,884
[-37.7] [-40.7] [-16.3] [-26.7]
Notes:  Numbers in brackets show the percentage of pre-displacement earnings that earnings losses in year t+5 amount to. Losses
             are statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test), except those in bold.  All regressions account for the clustering
             of observations by individuals.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.   
  - 28 - 
Table 7  Earnings losses (in 2000$) of Canadian workers displaced through firm closures – No 




Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -837 -840 -1,163 -998
(236) (213) (224) (196)
2 years before -947 -1,106 -2,404 -2,325
(268) (243) (248) (223)
1 year before -449 -679 -2,125 -2,121
(279) (253) (255) (230)
Year of displacement -5,240 -6,029 -6,037 -6,497
(284) (260) (263) (239)
1 year after -7,430 -8,513 -6,993 -7,723
(278) (259) (275) (252)
2 years after -5,243 -7,046 -4,999 -6,304
(282) (267) (281) (260)
3 years after -4,960 -6,761 -4,783 -6,065
(284) (268) (281) (260)
4 years after -4,538 -6,191 -4,393 -5,650
(295) (276) (289) (267)
5 years after -4,453 -6,185 -4,252 -5,714
(310) (286) (300) (272)
Models with worker-specific trends
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -215 -144 -173 -98
(261) (236) (233) (206)
2 years before 27 -40 -747 -760
(379) (344) (328) (296)
1 year before 1,205 1,098 -59 -141
(488) (445) (413) (378)
Year of displacement -3,225 -3,879 -3,716 -4,276
(595) (545) (507) (471)
1 year after -4,611 -5,725 -4,308 -5,099
(695) (642) (607) (569)
2 years after -1,665 -3,152 -1,977 -2,960
(804) (746) (698) (657)
3 years after -669 -2,032 -1,449 -2,270
(915) (850) (794) (751)
4 years after 419 -659 -775 -1,410
(1029) (958) (895) (848)
5 years after 1,123 494 -375 -841
(1148) (1068) (996) (943)
1. Standard errors, adjusted for the clustering of observations by individuals, are between parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.
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Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before 466 588 -165 -92
(183) (169) (213) (181)
2 years before -445 -331 -831 -1,076
(215) (195) (227) (199)
1 year before -2,122 -2,014 -1,803 -2,131
(222) (202) (236) (207)
Year of displacement -10,461 -11,654 -7,939 -8,774
(259) (243) (293) (260)
1 year after -12,555 -17,584 -9,742 -13,479
(289) (292) (330) (311)
2 years after -10,167 -15,007 -7,241 -10,955
(277) (283) (322) (310)
3 years after -8,183 -12,609 -6,536 -9,731
(283) (285) (322) (309)
4 years after -8,228 -11,788 -6,314 -8,868
(289) (284) (333) (310)
5 years after -7,119 -9,732 -6,052 -7,983
(294) (280) (346) (311)
Models with worker-specific trends
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -1,301 -1,422 -777 -851
(210) (186) (237) (201)
2 years before -2,774 -2,917 -1,425 -1,848
(324) (284) (327) (281)
1 year before -4,643 -4,747 -2,317 -2,820
(422) (375) (420) (363)
Year of displacement -12,968 -14,198 -8,456 -9,464
(542) (489) (550) (483)
1 year after -15,221 -20,348 -9,999 -14,009
(652) (600) (663) (597)
2 years after -13,038 -18,028 -7,258 -11,348
(740) (681) (753) (681)
3 years after -11,306 -15,925 -6,338 -10,009
(842) (772) (845) (765)
4 years after -11,648 -15,435 -5,929 -9,053
(948) (868) (950) (854)
5 years after -10,883 -13,747 -5,505 -8,096
(1051) (960) (1056) (940)
1. Standard errors, adjusted for the clustering of observations by individuals, are between parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File. 
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Table 9   Long-term earnings losses (in 2000$) of high-seniority workers displaced through firm closures or  
                mass layoffs – Various subgroups
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
sample sample sample sample
Aged 25 to 34
Fixed-effects models -6,398 -9,483 -4,687 -6,604
[-18.8] [-28.0] [-21.5] [-30.4]
Models with trends -14,405 -17,188 -8,737 -11,098
[-42.3] [-50.7] [-40.2] [-51.1]
Aged 35 to 49
Fixed-effects models -7,212 -10,076 -6,164 -8,302
[-16.8] [-23.5] [-25.6] [-34.8]
Models with trends -8,526 -11,432 -2,577 -5,304
[-19.9] [-26.7] [-10.7] [-22.3]
Employed in manufacturing
Fixed-effects models -7,714 -10,294 -7,267 -8,604
[-20.3] [-27.4] [-32.2] [-38.7]
Models with trends -11,717 -15,200 -7,065 -9,110
[-30.9] [-40.5] [-31.3] [-41.0]
Employed outside manufacturing
Fixed-effects models -6,908 -9,260 -5,218 -7,099
[-17.3] [-23.2] [-22.1] [-30.2]
Models with trends -11,879 -14,143 -5,597 -8,104
[-29.8] [-35.4] [-23.8] [-34.5]
Employed in firms with <=100 employees
Fixed-effects models -7,126 -8,816 -5,350 -7,230
[-19.3] [-23.9] [-25.7] [-34.9]
Models with trends -10,755 -12,921 -5,302 -8,312
[-29.1] [-35.1] [-25.5] [-40.1]
Employed in firms with >100 employees
Fixed-effects models -6,199 -10,209 -6,528 -8,514
[-14.9] [-24.6] [-25.0] [-33.1]
Models with trends -9,067 -12,923 -5,744 -7,619
[-21.7] [-31.1] [-22.0] [-29.6]
Notes: Numbers in brackets show the percentage of pre-displacement earnings that earnings losses in year t+5 amount to. Losses
            are statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test). All regressions account for the clustering of observations
            by individuals.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.   
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Table 10  Earnings losses of Canadian workers displaced through firm closures or mass layoffs 




Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -49 91 -645 -469
(152) (138) (163) (142)
2 years before -442 -409 -1,586 -1,506
(173) (157) (178) (160)
1 year before -596 -568 -1,619 -1,674
(179) (163) (188) (167)
Year of displacement -6,949 -7,879 -6,406 -7,075
(189) (176) (201) (182)
1 year after -9,041 -12,884 -7,522 -10,581
(198) (196) (218) (208)
2 years after -6,822 -10,799 -5,193 -8,445
(198) (196) (219) (210)
3 years after -5,615 -9,345 -4,587 -7,519
(200) (197) (221) (211)
4 years after -5,309 -8,391 -4,177 -6,665
(207) (200) (227) (213)
5 years after -4,819 -6,867 -3,975 -5,796
(215) (201) (238) (215)
Models with worker-specific trends
Men Women
Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Displacement variables sample sample sample sample
3 years before -115 -80 -372 -271
(177) (157) (178) (153)
2 years before -381 -405 -915 -881
(262) (234) (256) (223)
1 year before -203 -185 -712 -759
(339) (306) (329) (288)
Year of displacement -6,288 -7,138 -5,469 -6,081
(423) (385) (410) (361)
1 year after -8,036 -11,897 -6,393 -9,432
(503) (463) (492) (440)
2 years after -5,510 -9,581 -3,886 -7,153
(581) (535) (566) (507)
3 years after -4,028 -7,911 -3,125 -6,097
(663) (609) (644) (575)
4 years after -3,480 -6,757 -2,579 -5,123
(749) (689) (723) (645)
5 years after -2,782 -5,048 -2,262 -4,147
(833) (766) (807) (717)
1. Standard errors, adjusted for the clustering of observations by individuals, are between parentheses.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.
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Table 11  Long-term earnings losses as a percentage of pre-displacement earnings – Summary
Definition of displacement:       Firm closures
      Firm closures     or mass layoffs




   Narrow sub-sample
      All displaced workers -16 4
1 -15 -9
      High-seniority displaced workers -19 -28 -18 -28
   Broad sub-sample
      All displaced workers -22 2
1 -22 -16
      High-seniority displaced workers -25 -34 -25 -35
Women
   Narrow sub-sample
      All displaced workers -25 -2
1 -21 -12
      High-seniority displaced workers -29 -23 -26 -24
   Broad sub-sample
      All displaced workers -34 -5
1 -31 -22
      High-seniority displaced workers -37 -35 -35 -35
1. Number is based on parameter estimates that are not statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Longitudinal Worker File.
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Appendix
Table 1a  Displacement rates and permanent layoff rates of workers aged 50 to 64,
1 1988 to 2002
             Men              Women
Permanent Permanent
layoff rates layoff rates
Firm Firm Firm Firm
closures closures + closures closures +
mass layoffs mass layoffs
percentage
1988 7.1 0.7 1.6 4.4 0.5 0.8
1989 6.8 0.7 1.5 4.1 0.5 0.8
1990 7.9 1.0 2.3 4.9 0.7 1.1
1991 8.2 0.8 2.6 5.0 0.6 1.1
1992 7.9 0.8 2.6 5.1 0.6 1.3
1993 7.5 0.7 1.9 4.6 0.5 1.0
1994 7.1 0.7 1.8 4.2 0.4 0.9
1995 7.1 0.6 1.7 3.8 0.4 0.8
1996 6.7 0.6 1.4 3.7 0.4 0.7
1997 6.6 0.6 1.1 3.6 0.5 0.7
1998 6.5 0.6 1.1 3.4 0.4 0.7
1999 6.0 0.5 1.1 3.0 0.4 0.7
2000 5.9 0.5 1.1 3.7 0.4 0.6
2001 7.4 0.6 1.7 4.6 0.5 1.0
2002 7.1 0.6 1.3 4.4 0.4 0.9
Table 1b  Estimated number of workers displaced or permanently laid-off, aged 50 to 64
1, 1988 to 2002
             Men              Women
Permanently Permanently
laid-off laid-off
Firm Firm Firm Firm
closures closures + closures closures +
mass layoffs mass layoffs
1988 57,280 5,650 12,908 19,100 2,170 3,472
1989 55,070 5,670 12,148 18,830 2,300 3,674
1990 64,750 8,200 18,852 23,640 3,380 5,308
1991 66,890 6,530 21,210 24,660 2,960 5,426
1992 64,110 6,490 21,102 25,910 3,050 6,605
1993 61,530 5,740 15,587 24,070 2,620 5,233
1994 59,740 5,890 15,144 22,940 2,180 4,915
1995 62,150 5,250 14,882 22,030 2,320 4,637
1996 62,320 5,580 13,023 23,430 2,530 4,434
1997 67,160 6,110 11,193 26,190 3,640 5,092
1998 71,740 6,620 12,141 28,100 3,310 5,784
1999 71,240 5,940 13,060 27,960 3,730 6,524
2000 75,660 6,410 14,121 38,610 4,170 6,275
2001 80,290 6,510 18,445 31,480 3,420 6,845
2002 80,420 6,800 14,726 32,110 2,920 6,568
1. Employed outside public services in firms with at least two employees.
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal Worker File.
Displacement rates  Displacement rates 
due to: due to:
Displaced 
due to: due to:
Displaced  
  - 34 - 
 
 
Figure 1  Earnings trajectories of high-seniority males displaced through firm closures 
 - Narrow sub-sample in 1989 and 1997
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal 
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Figure 2  Earnings trajectories of high-seniority males displaced through firm closures 
 – Broad sub-sample in 1989 and 1997
Source: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, the Longitudinal 
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